C igarette smoking is the largest single health risk in the United States, accounting for approximately 440,000 deaths each year (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services [USDHHS] 2004b
). The financial cost of smoking-attributable health care expenditures and lost productivity has been well documented (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC] 2003) . In general, smokers have higher health care expenditures and more sick days than do nonsmokers (Max 2001) . However, the effects of smoking-attributable mortality on income distributions are less well known.
Premature death attributable to smoking may redistribute Social Security income in unanticipated ways that affect behavior and reduce the economic well-being of smokers and their dependent spouses and children (Rice et al. 1986 ). Knowledge of how smoking redistributes both individual and household Social Security benefits and taxes is important not only from the perspectives of informing smoking cessation efforts (Rice et al. 1986 ) and evaluating proposals to improve family welfare through reductions in system inequities or promotion of social adequacy but also from the standpoint of managing the Social Security System's finances. Social Security is financed by a pay-as-you-go tax levied on earnings; thus, if the harmful health effects of smoking reduce individual or household hours of work, these effects have implications for the system's funding.
Economists employ the comprehensive marginal tax rate to assess the distortionary effect of taxation on labor supply and welfare (Armour and Pitts 2004) . One important component of this comprehensive marginal tax rate in the United States is the Social Security payroll tax, which is assessed on individual earnings up to the annual taxable maximum. In 2002 approximately 94 percent of all U.S. workers earned less than the annual taxable maximum of $84,900, thus incurring an Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) Social Security payroll tax at the margin.
1 For these individuals, Social Security is a benefit tax for which an extra dollar of earnings may increase their future benefits at retirement. Therefore, the net marginal Social Security tax rate (NMSSTR)-defined as the difference between the statutory payroll tax rate and the present value of the stream of future benefits to which an additional dollar of earnings entitles the covered worker-should be used in calculating the marginal tax rate for the purpose of assessing the effect of taxation on labor supply and welfare. 2 Studies that have used the NMSSTR to examine the distributional effects of Social Security concluded that Social Security benefit and tax rules create NMSSTRs that treat workers differently depending on age, gender, race, dependency status, earnings, insurance status, and income-related life expectancy (for example, Aaron 1977; Browning 1985; Burkhauser and Turner 1985; Feldstein and Samwick 1992; Armour and Pitts 2004) . To our knowledge, no study has looked at lifestyle and the harmful health effects of an addictive habit such as smoking on NMSSTR estimation. This study contributes to the literature by examining the distributional effects of smokingattributable mortality on NMSSTR estimation.
Methods
Social Security benefit determination. The Social Security benefits to which a covered worker is entitled at retirement depend on lifetime earnings. Average indexed monthly earnings (AIME) is the measure of lifetime earnings on which benefits are based. Earnings are indexed by multiplying a worker's taxable earnings by an indexing factor for each year after 1950 through the indexing year. The indexing year is defined as the year a worker attains age sixty. The indexing factor for each year, t, is obtained by dividing average covered worker earnings in the indexing year, E -
, by average covered worker earnings at each age, a, in each year, E -
. The AIME for individuals retiring in year t is (1) For individuals attaining age sixty-two after 1991, the AIME is based on the highest thirty-five years of earnings. However, for each year a worker is born before 1929, the number of years, n, in the computation period is reduced by one. To convert the AIME from an annual to a monthly basis, it is divided by 12. E t denotes worker earnings in year t. The set of all years through age sixty that will be counted among the highest thirty-five or n years of earnings is denoted by A. B denotes the set of years between age sixty and the year prior to retirement in which a year of unindexed earnings replaces a year of indexed earnings in the benefit formula.
Once the AIME is determined, the primary insurance amount (PIA)-the amount of monthly benefits payable at retirement-may be calculated. 3 The benefits formula for a covered worker attaining age sixty-two in 2002 is (2) PIA = [0.90 × (AIME ≤ $592)] + [0.32 × ($592 < AIME ≤ $3,567)] + [0.15 × (AIME > $3,567)].
The PIA is composed of two parts: the bend points (the dollar amounts defining the AIME bracket in the benefit formula) and the marginal replacement rate (the applicable percentage used to determine the PIA).
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The benefit formula illustrates one fundamental feature of the system: the progressive structure of Social Security. Low-earning workers are afforded proportionately greater benefits with a marginal replacement rate of 90 percent when compared
with average-earning and high-earning workers, whose marginal replacement rates are 32 percent and 15 percent, respectively. Because the Social Security benefit formula classifies workers into one of three earnings groups, the NMSSTR by sex and age is calculated for a representative worker in each group. Calculation of the NMSSTR. NMSSTRs by sex, age, and earnings classification are calculated under two alternative scenarios. The first scenario uses a common mortality assumption, and the second scenario accounts for smoking-attributable mortality in calculating the NMSSTR.
The NMSSTR is T ∼ = T -B PV . T denotes the OASI statutory rate, which is defined as the combined employee-employer legislated rate. The combined employee-employer tax rate was 10.6 percent in 2002. 5 This analysis assumes that the employee pays the tax.
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Primary beneficiary (single). The present value of the change in anticipated future benefits resulting from a $1 change in earnings is
The future benefits that an additional dollar of earnings entitles an individual to at retirement depend on the marginal replacement rate, (∂PIA)/(∂AIME), and the age, a, at which the individual plans to retire. Workers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age, f. 7 The indexing factor at each age, (1 + g)
, is estimated assuming that earnings grow at a real rate of 1.1 percent. 8 The probability that an individual (Browning 1985; Burkhauser and Turner 1985) . 3. The benefit amount that family members may receive each month is limited. The limit varies but generally equals about 150 to 180 percent of PIA. If the sum of the benefits payable to family members exceeds this limit, their benefits will be reduced. However, any benefits paid to a surviving divorced widow or widower do not count toward this maximum amount (see USDHHS 2004a). 4. The 1977 amendments to the Social Security Act indexed the benefit formula's bend points to the growth rate in average covered earnings. The marginal replacement rates were fixed at 90, 32, and 15 percent, respectively (see USDHHS 2004a). 5. The tax rate ignores the disability insurance (DI) and health insurance (HI) contribution rates.
Including both rates increases the net marginal Social Security tax rate by the statutory amount. In 2002 the combined employee-employer DI and HI rates were 1.8 and 2.9 percent, respectively (see USDHHS 2004a). 6. Brittain (1972) found that the payroll tax reduced employee earnings by the full amount of the tax. 7. The formula in equation (3) estimates the actuarial present value of anticipated future benefits relative to some benchmark retirement age. The age chosen here, f, is defined as the full benefit retirement age, which corresponds to the age at which an individual is first eligible for retirement benefits without actuarial adjustment. Following legislation implemented in the 1983 amendments to the Social Security Act, the full benefit retirement age increased two months per year, from sixty-five to sixty-six, from 2000 to 2005. Between 2005 and 2016 the full benefit retirement age will remain at sixty-six. In 2017, the full benefit retirement age is scheduled to increase two months per year and will be fixed at age sixty-seven for those attaining age sixty-two after the year 2022. The retirement age for workers with a full benefit retirement age in terms of years and months is rounded to the next full year in all calculations. of sex s and age a in year t will be eligible for benefits at age f in year t˘(t˘= t + f -a) is denoted by i s, f,t˘,t . 9 The probability of an individual of sex s surviving from age a to age j is denoted by P s,t ( j|a) . N is the age at which all persons are assumed to be dead and is set at 100 in all calculations. The rate at which a worker discounts future benefits, r, is set at 3 percent in all calculations.
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To illustrate, consider the case of a man who is fifty-five years old in 2002 and plans to retire at age sixty-six in 2011. Because he will attain age sixty-two after 1991, the AIME is based on the highest thirty-five years of earnings. Earnings through age sixty are indexed to the growth rate in average covered earnings. Assuming that real earnings grow at a rate of 1.1 percent annually, then (1 + g) max(60-55) = 1.056. An additional dollar of earnings at age fifty-five increases average indexed earnings by $(1/35)(1.056) ≈ $0.03.
Assuming that the fifty-five-year-old man is a lifetime average wage earner, his marginal replacement rate is 0.32, and an extra dollar of earnings at age fifty-five would increase the PIA by $(0.03)(0.32) ≈ $0.0097. The present value of the change in anticipated future benefits resulting from a $1 change in earnings is 0.0097 ∑ N = 100 P f,t ( j| 55)(1 + r) 55-j . The discounted sum of survival probabilities for a man aged fiftyfive is 7.838. Multiplying 0.076 (0.0097 × 7.838) by the probability that a fifty-fiveyear-old man will be eligible for Social Security benefits at the full benefit retirement age, 0.931, yields an estimate of B PV ≈ 0.0705. Subtracting 0.0705 from the statutory rate yields 0.0355, or 3.55 percent.
NMSSTRs for representative low-, average-, and high-earning workers by sex and select ages in 2002 are shown in Table 1 . The estimates reveal that men and women at each age face an NMSSTR that is less than the statutory rate and that the NMSSTR declines with age. The age differential is the result of higher conditional survival probabilities and the fact that older workers have a shorter period over which to discount future benefits. Also, low-earning workers incur the lowest NMSSTR, as expected given the progressive nature of the benefit formula.
Across earning classes, women at most ages incur a lower NMSSTR than do men. The estimated NMSSTR for a low-earning woman aged fifty-five is 1.12 percentage points lower than the rate faced by her male counterpart (-10.34 percent compared with -9.22 percent). Gender differences in the NMSSTR are approximately 0.4 percentage points for average-earning individuals and 0.2 percentage points for high-FEDERAL RESER VE BANK OF ATLANTA Note: Workers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age. Low-earning workers expect a marginal replacement rate of 0.9, and average-and high-earning workers expect rates of 0.32 and 0.15, respectively. A real discount rate of 3 percent is assumed. The growth rate in real earnings is set at 1.1 percent.
earning individuals aged fifty-five; this differential is attributable to the longer life expectancy of females. The NMSSTR for a woman aged sixty-five with average lifetime earnings is 0.9 percentage points higher than the rate for her male counterpart. Older women incur a higher NMSSTR because they have less of an attachment to the labor force and thus have a lower probability of being fully insured for benefits.
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Primary beneficiary and dependent spouse. Women who are married and do not work outside the home or fail to qualify for benefits based on their own earnings histories may qualify for dependent spouse benefits. Thus the present value of anticipated future benefits also depends on whether a primary beneficiary claims benefits for a dependent spouse.
12 A dependent spouse is entitled to an additional 50 percent of the primary beneficiary's benefit amount at retirement. In addition, if the primary beneficiary dies, the widow is entitled to 100 percent of the primary beneficiary's benefit. 13 The formula (obtained from Feldstein and Samwick 1992) for calculating the present value of the change in anticipated future benefits resulting from a $1 change in earnings for a male worker age a with a dependent spouse is shown in equation (4); (4) where 1 = male, 2 = female, and a dependent wife is assumed to be the same age as her husband. The definitions of the other characters are identical to those for a single primary beneficiary.
The first term of equation (4) denotes the expected value of the widow's benefits conditional on the worker dying at age a. The second term denotes the expected
9. To qualify for Social Security benefits, an individual must be fully insured. The measure used to determine whether a worker is eligible for retirement benefits is quarters of coverage. Under current legislation, a worker is fully insured if he obtains one quarter of coverage for each year after 1950 (or age twenty-one, if later) and before the year he dies, becomes disabled, or attains age sixty-two (USDHHS 2001). The minimum number of quarters required to be fully insured ranges from six to forty. Unpublished insurance rate estimates were provided by the Social Security Office of the Actuary. The data contained projections covering the period 2002 by sex and age for the number of fully insured workers as a percentage of the total population. 10. A rate of 3 percent was chosen to approximate an individual's rate of time preference. As before, this rate was chosen on the basis of recommendations contained in USDHHS (2005). 11. The probability that a man aged sixty-five was fully insured for benefits in the year 2002 was 0.929. In comparison, the probability that a sixty-five-year-old female was fully insured was 0.741. These unpublished estimates were provided by the Social Security Office of the Actuary. 12. The Social Security Administration estimates that, of the 21.4 million women aged sixty-two and older in 2000, 8.2 million were entitled to primary benefits only, 5.9 million were dually entitled, and 7.4 million were solely entitled to benefits as a dependent spouse and failed to qualify for benefits based on their own earnings history (USDHHS 2001). 13. Widows and widowers become eligible to receive survivor benefits at age sixty. However, children and disability may lower the age of eligibility. A detailed explanation of how these criteria may affect the age that survivors may be first eligible for benefits is contained in USDHHS (2001).
value of the primary beneficiary's retirement benefit conditional on attaining the full benefit retirement age, f. The third term denotes the expected value of the dependent spouse's benefit conditional on both parties reaching the full benefit retirement age. Because beneficiaries with a dependent spouse do not pay any additional taxes for the additional benefit, they incur a lower NMSSTR than do singles. The NMSSTR for an average-earning man aged fifty-five with a dependent spouse, assuming a discount rate of 3 percent, is -0.02 percent (see Table 1 ). This negative tax rate is a net marginal subsidy and is lower than the rate incurred by female dependent spouses, whose NMSSTR equals the statutory rate of 10.6 percent.
Smoking-attributable mortality. The progressivity of the Social Security benefit formula is based on a common mortality assumption. However, the literature contains evidence that smoking reduces life expectancy (USDHHS 2004b). Life tables published by the National Center for Health Statistics are used to construct and account for differences in life expectancy among current and former smokers as well as people who have never smoked in determining NMSSTRs. The approach utilizes the mortality ratios of Thun et al. (1997) and current and former smoking prevalence estimates for persons aged thirty-five through sixty-four made available by the CDC (2007). The method of estimation is described below.
Estimates of the total number of survivors, l a , by sex, s, and exact age, a, are shown in Table 2 . The probability of an individual of sex s surviving from age a to age j is P s ( j|a) = l j / l a . The mortality rate at each age is calculated by subtracting survival probabilities at each age from 1.
The mortality ratio, which is the ratio of one group's death rate to that of the population, was used to split the table into three categories: current smokers, former smokers, and those who never smoked. The mortality ratio (M) by smoking status (SS) at each age (a) is M SS,a = q SS,a /q T,a . The mortality rate for the total population is q T, a , and q SS,a denotes the mortality rate by smoking status. For example, the mortality rate for current smokers by sex and exact age is calculated as q CS,a = M CS,a × q T,a . For persons aged twenty-one through thirty-five, the mortality ratio for male and female current and former smokers was assumed to be 1. For men aged thirty-five and older, the mortality ratios for current smokers and former smokers were 2.30 and 1.46, respectively. For female current and former smokers aged thirty-five and older, the mortality ratios were 1.92 and 1.30, respectively. 14 To determine the number of survivors by smoking class, we initially assumed that 23.2 percent of men were current smokers and 34.3 percent were former smokers. For women, we assumed that 18.7 percent were current smokers and 22.9 percent were former smokers. 15 We subtracted mortality rates by sex for current smokers from 1 and multiplied by the number of current smokers that survived to age a -1 to estimate the number of current smokers by sex surviving to age a. The number of surviving former smokers by sex and age was calculated in a similar manner. The number of people who have never smoked of sex s surviving to age a was estimated by subtracting the number of current and former smokers from the total number of survivors. The number of survivors at each age in the three smoking classes, as shown in Note: "Survivors" refers to the number of persons by smoking status reaching age a during the year among the stationary population.
Source: Constructed from life tables published by the National Center for Health Statistics Table 2 , is then used to calculate the probability that a person age a will survive to age j. For each smoking class, the survival probabilities are in turn used to calculate B PV . NMSSTRs for single primary beneficiaries that account for smoking-attributable mortality by age, gender, and earnings class are shown in Table 3 . As expected, a comparison of the results in Tables 1 and 3 reveals that a smoker's shorter life expectancy increases the NMSSTR at each age. A single male current smoker aged fifty-five with lifetime average earnings faces a net tax rate of 6.51 percent, which is approximately 3 percentage points higher than the rate estimated under the common mortality assumption (3.55 percent). The NMSSTR for a single male former smoker aged fifty-five with average lifetime earnings is 4.92 percent, which is approximately 1.4 percentage points higher than the rate estimated under the common mortality assumption. The NMSSTR for a single man aged fifty-five who never smoked with average lifetime earnings is 1.25 percent-5.3 percentage points lower than the rate for a current smoker and 3.7 percentage points lower than the rate for a fifty-fiveyear-old former smoker of the same age.
A single female current smoker aged fifty-five with lifetime average earnings faces an NMSSTR of 5.13 percent, which is approximately 1.4 percentage points lower than the rate estimated for a fifty-five-year-old current smoking man with lifetime average earnings. The gender differential in NMSSTRs for both current and former smokers at each age is larger than the differential estimated under the common mortality assumption. In addition, sixty-five-year-old female current and former smokers now incur a lower NMSSTR than do their male counterparts. These gender differences result from males smoking at higher rates than females and having a higher smoking-attributable mortality risk.
As shown in Table 4 , a fifty-five-year-old male current smoker with lifetime average earnings and a dependent spouse who also smokes incurs an NMSSTR of 3.17 percent, which is more than 3 percentage points higher than the rate estimated under the common mortality assumption (-0.02). In addition, this rate is 1.69 percentage Note: Workers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age. Low-earning workers expect a marginal replacement rate of 0.9, and average-and high-earning workers expect rates of 0.32 and 0.15, respectively. A real discount rate of 3 percent is assumed. The growth rate in real earnings is set at 1.1 percent.
points higher than the rate incurred by a fifty-five-year-old male former smoker with lifetime average earnings and a dependent spouse who formerly smoked (1.48 percent) and approximately 5.5 percentage points higher than the rate incurred by a fifty-fiveyear-old male who never smoked with lifetime average earnings and a dependent spouse who never smoked (-2.49 percent).
Results and Discussion
As previous studies have shown, we find that Social Security treats single people and dual-income couples less equitably than single-income couples. This study's results add to previous findings by showing that NMSSTRs also vary by smoking status. 16 The higher tax rates that smokers incur may reduce their labor supply.
17 Given that Social Security is financed by a payroll tax on earnings, any reduction in the labor supply will have implications for the system's funding. However, the aggregate effect of smoking on the OASI Trust Fund's finances would depend on how smoking redistributes benefits from smokers to people who never smoked and the resulting labor supply response to changes in marginal tax rates.
While Social Security has reduced poverty among elderly Americans, young widows are at increased risk of living in poverty because of the premature death of their spouse (Redja 1994; Engelhardt and Gruber 2004; Sevak, Weir, and Willis 2004 Note: Workers are assumed to retire at the full benefit retirement age. Low-earnings workers expect a marginal replacement rate of 0.9, and average-and high-earning workers expect rates of 0.32 and 0.15, respectively. A real discount rate of 3 percent is assumed. The growth rate in real earnings is set at 1.1 percent.
United States under age sixty-five died of smoking-attributable illnesses between 1997 and 2001. 18 Widows with no children under age sixteen in their care who were married to fully insured workers who died prematurely may be ineligible for Social Security benefits until they reach age sixty. Estimates suggest that 15 percent of women aged fifty-four, too young to qualify for Social Security benefits, fall into poverty following the death of their husband (Sevak, Weir, and Willis 2004) . 19 As a result, it has been suggested that Social Security is failing to live up to one of its primary goals-providing adequate survivors insurance for older low-earning Americans (Gustman and Steinmeier 2002) . One proposal to improve Social Security's adequacy is to lower the eligibility age for widows from sixty years to fifty-five years (Redja 1994). 20 In addition to the establishment of private accounts, two of the three plans proposed by the President's Commission to Strengthen Social Security (2001) recommended an increase in benefits for low-earning widows and widowers.
Because low-earning workers are more likely to smoke and smokers are more likely than people who have never smoked to die prematurely, an unintended distributional effect of enacting proposals that would reduce widows' retirement age or increase retirement benefits among low-earning widows and widowers would be to redistribute benefits from people who have never smoked to smokers, thus benefiting behavior that is detrimental to health. As with life insurance, perhaps this unintended effect could be offset by smokers' paying a higher premium, in this case a smoker's insurance tax rate. The revenue generated from a tax levied on current smokers could be added to the OASI Trust Fund and used to reduce financial hardship currently faced by young widows and widowers by paying increased benefits or paying benefits at an earlier age. In addition, the higher tax penalty associated with smoking may increase cessation. The aggregate impact of such a change on the various trust fund finances would be a valuable addition to the debates surrounding the system's solvency and ways to reduce poverty among widows and widowers. 16. It has been suggested that premature deaths attributable to smoking save Social Security money (Shoven, Sundberg, and Bunker 1987) . One should not infer from these results that because smokers incur a higher NMSSTR they pay more than their fair share to Social Security; the higher NMSSTR may cause smokers to reduce their labor supply and thereby reduce Social Security contributions. In addition, Social Security disability payments to persons with smoking-attributable diseases and payments to dependents and survivors of deceased smokers will offset reductions in future system liabilities that stem from smoking-attributable death. 17. In addition to reducing hours of work, an increase in taxes may decrease labor force participation. Specifically, smoking may lead to a reduction in labor supply through early retirement. Retirement studies have typically used average life expectancy by age as opposed to predictions based on health status in their analysis (Social Security Advisory Council 1997 As in previous studies, these results are limited in that they are based on hypothetical workers; thus, the relative importance of various economic assumptions and differences is an empirical question. 21 Because analysis with money flows over time may be sensitive to the choice of discount rate, selective results shown in Tables 1,  3 , and 4 for workers with average lifetime earnings were reestimated under alternative discount rate assumptions. As shown in Table 5 , a lower discount rate reduces the NMSSTR at each age.
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Although the calculations presented are complex, they oversimplify the Social Security program in a number of ways. First, we focus on OASI and ignored the DI and HI components of Social Security. Second, we ignore benefits for dependent children of young widows or widowers. Third, we ignore the possibility of divorce and remarriage. Fourth, the employer portion of the payroll tax is tax exempt, and given the progressive nature of income taxation, this exemption disproportionately benefits higher-earning individuals. Thus, the NMSSTR for high-earning individuals may be lower than the estimates reported. Fifth, smoking prevalence is held constant across earnings classes. Because lower-earning individuals have a higher smoking prevalence than do higher-earning individuals, low-earning individuals' NMSSTRs may be higher than the rates reported whereas average-and high-earning individuals may have NMSSTRs that are lower than the rates reported.
A final potential limitation to our results is that the mortality risk measures used to account for the mortality difference among current and former smokers are adjusted FEDERAL RESER VE BANK OF ATLANTA for sex and age only. Other risk factors such as educational status, diet, and alcohol consumption that are correlated with smoking were unaccounted for in the mortality risk measure that was used. As a consequence, the NMSSTR estimates may overstate the tax penalty associated with smoking (Shoven, Sundberg, and Bunker 1987; Thun et al. 1997) . However, this limitation may not pose too great a problem because evidence in the literature suggests that when behavioral and demographic factors correlated with smoking were taken into account, the higher mortality risks faced by smokers did not change much (Malarcher et al. 2000; Thun et al. 1997 ).
Conclusion
The analyses reveal that smokers will incur higher net marginal tax rates than people who never smoked and may reduce their labor supply. 23 Any reduction in labor supply among smokers will have implications for the system's funding. Knowledge of the distributional effects of smoking on Social Security is important not only from the standpoint of the system's funding but also from the perspective of informing smoking cessation efforts (Rice et al. 1986 ). People can avoid higher net marginal tax rates by never smoking or reduce them by quitting smoking. Finally, smoking status should be considered in assessing Social Security legislative proposals designed to reduce system inequities or promote social adequacy-in particular, amendments designed to reduce poverty among young widows and widowers. Failure to do so may unintentionally promote behavior that is detrimental to health. 21. However, this methodology is the best one can do since the actual data are unavailable (Garrett 1995) .
For a discussion of the usefulness of results based on hypothetical worker data, see Leimer (1995) . 22. The calculations shown in Tables 1, 3 , and 4 ignored the personal income tax bracket at which Social Security retirement benefits will be taxed during retirement. Thus, the estimates shown in Table 5 assumed that Social Security benefits will be subject to a federal income tax rate of 15 percent. For a single male current smoker aged fifty-five, assuming a discount rate of 3 percent, taxation of benefits increased his NMSSTR by 0.3 percentage points (6.51 percent versus 6.81 percent). 23. The evidence is mixed on the impact of Social Security on the labor supply although the predominant research in this area has focused on the labor supply responses of older workers (Krueger and Meyer 2002) .
